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LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, PLI. 
a Delaware corporation, ) • 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
) 
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Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Rules of the lT* •*. 
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the defendant'^ Statement of Facts, 
The plaintiffs take exception to a number of assertions 
by defendantf both in its Statement of Facts section and later in 
the Argument when referring to the facts; first, because as often 
as not counsel for the defendant cites no point in the Record from 
which the alleged facts are being stated; and second, because they 
are either incomplete or misstate the facts. One flagrant example 
is at Page 6 of defendant's Brief where it is stated: 
"Royalty payments have been made to plaintiffs and other 
mineral owners in Section 25 resulting from the well 
drilled on plaintiffs1 property, as well as from a well 
drilled on adjacent lands." 
No reference is made to the record, and defendant 
neglects to add that, notwithstanding some oil was pumped and 
considerable natural gas continued to flow, no royalty payments 
have been received by the plaintiffs from March 1986 to the time 
of trial as indicated in the Record, pages 202 and 203, and as 
demonstrated by Exhibits 4 and 5. 
That same Exhibit 5 shows considerable oil production in 
the year prior to 1986 and very little production (only a few 
barrels a month) thereafter. That exhibit emphasizes the court's 
finding that defendant's presence on the property is entirely in 
its control and refutes assertions by defendant in its Brief at 
pages 6 and 7 that "Defendant's use of the property is not 
perpetual" and "Ed Whicker testified that in his opinion the well 
would be plugged and the ground restored to its original condition 
in 1996." 
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Defendant is thus clearlv :n error t asserting at page 8: 
"No" ' • : •--.:w • ; = - iiiiiiiiiia.- ;iiiv.:unt wi residual value 
awarder) wo; Id totally disregard tne testimorr. presented 
that defendant's us- is limit-*'! - i-;m^#" 
tao*-> /;r cf defendant1-- Brier is asserted that 
"Mr, LM liner" s valuation is udseu ;i a :" - ':tple 
valuation. (Plaintiffs treated that earlier " m m a r 
Energy is restricted i M ;^c M<=O of +-nt. subject c r o o e r t y , 
cannot sell or transfer the same and will eventually 
return complete ownership to plaintiffs." 
Plaintiffs have also treated the matter of the prospects 
for return of the property, but counsel for defendant is simply 
misstating the law in claiming that Linmar Energy cannot sell or 
transfer its interest in that easement. It is to be noted that 
Linmar was not the original lessee on this property. Linmar 
acquired it from Walter Duncan (Ex. 17) and therefore came into 
its interest after the fact and is at full liberty to assign that 
lease, together with the easement to whomever it chooses, and 
there is simply no indication by way of evidence or law in the 
record to suggest anything to the contrary. If counsel for 
defense means that defendant cannot build a house on its easement, 
that brings us to the following group of questions and answers by 
defense counsel of Mr. Palmer: 
"Q You think it's fair for an oil company who does not obtain 
the rights of the fee title owner to have to pay a fee title 
interest value? 
"A There are two ways you need to look at that. If you was 
interested—well can I make an example? 
"Q Sure. 
"A If you was interested in a piece of property that I owned, 
but my mother, who was 73 had a life estate in it, I can sell 
you that property. Would you pay more for that property than 
an adjoining piece of property that my son who is 25 years old, 
had a life estate in? Linmar has the property tied up for an 
indefinite period of time. They can keep it for six months. 
They can keep it for 20 years or forever. The landowner 
doesn't have any say about it. And yes I do think that is 
taking the property owner's rights away." (R. 572-73) 
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evidence in this case indicates that the well site should have 
been placed on other property. Nevertheless the thrust of 
plaintiffs1 argument in Point I of their Brief was that there were 
reasonable alternatives on the Smith property. Defendant failed 
to meaningfully address those arguments, and plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that they thereby concede the point. 
The defendant is in error about the facts in asserting 
on page 7: 
"Mr. Smith's only position was that he did not want 
the well or road anywhere on his property and refused to 
discuss options involving his property." 
The testimony on those discussions appears in the body 
of plaintiffs' original Brief (see page 22 thereof) and makes it 
abundantly clear that several "options involving his property," 
to-wit, access from at least two other sources to the proposed 
well site were discussed at length and that it was the defendant 
who refused to budge, not Mr. Smith. Also in that summary in 
plaintiffs' Brief the dispute over whether or not Mr. Whicker 
proposed any alternative, to-wit, access along the east border or 
down the middle of the property was sharply disputed, Smith 
asserting no such option was provided, and Whicker insisting that, 
while he "had no record" that any such option was offered by him 
at the time of the conversations, he would have made such an offer 
if he had been asked. (R. 231-2) 
At page 4 of defendant's Brief it is asserted that the 
well was placed in the southwest corner of the property for 
"geological and economic factors." Those "factors" are not based 
upon any technical data. There is no showing that another 
location on the property would not have been equally as good 
geologically and economically. The geological and ecomonical 
factors are nothing more than a "rule of thumb" of sorts that 
defendant wanted to locate the well as near as possible to where 
another well was already located. Certainly, under Flying Diamond 
defendant does not have the right to place its well anywhere it 
wants just to save a dollar if the result is unreasonably 
destructive to the landowner. It is a matter of balancing 
interests, and the general notion of locating near where another 
well is located, without any other data, ought to yield to the 
substantial and known needs of the landowner. 
As to the matter of whether any other options were 
afforded to plaintiffs, we desire to point out that Mr. Whicker 
had no "recollection" of having been asked to locate the road 
elsewhere. As to the well itself, he stated at R. 192 (Tr. 27): 
"Q And that's your only reason, so you didn't give him any 
options to try to suggest you put it some other place, you 
wanted that southwest corner — period paragraph, on this 
Smith property, right? 
"A We wanted to put the well as far to the southwest as we 
very possibly could. 
"Q So the answer to my question is — 
"A Yes." 
The testimony is contradictory as to whether defendant 
ever asked plaintiffs where they wanted the road. Plaintiffs 
assert that defendant did not so ask (R. 627-28), and defendant 
claims it did (R. 191-193). There is no dispute, however, that 
defendant never gave plaintiffs any option as to the actual site 
of the well. (R. 192) 
POINT III. THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF THE TRACT IN 
QUESTION IS FOR SUBDIVISION PURPOSES AS TESTIFIED BY APPRAISER 
PALMER, WHOSE TESTIMONEY WAS NOT IMPEACHED. 
In its Point II.A. defendant argues that Richard 
Palmer's testimony regarding the highest and best use as being 
subdivision is impeached. 
At pages 17 and 18 of defendant's Brief, under the 
heading "Bias," defendant states: 
"Mr. Palmer was aware of Howard Carroll's $2,000 
per acre valuation and that said price was not high 
enough for plaintiffs' purposes." 
That language implies that Mr. Palmer testified that the entire 
tract was evaluated by him at $4,200 per acre. That is simply not 
the fact. The $4,200-per acre figure related to the 4.76 acres 
taken, and as noted in plaintiffs' Brief at' page 33, the "before" 
value for the entire parcel, as testified to by Mr. Palmer, was 
$2,500 per acre. (R. 369) 
Defendant then attempts at pages 18 through 21 of its 
Brief to impeach the testimony of Richard Palmer. 
With regard to the highest and best use, defendant 
claims that Mr. Palmer's opinion "is in complete disregard" of: 
"(i) the fact that property had always been used for 
agricultural purposes," (Emphasis added.) 
Palmer acknowledged such agricultural use and, as 
pointed out at some length in plaintiffs1 Brief, because of the 
other considerations, such as the proximity to Altamont City, the 
demand for residential lots, the development and sale of 
residential subdivisions in the area, the proximity of utilities 
either on the property or immediately adjacent thereto, were the 
basis for his opinion. This court has repeatedly held that the 
actual present use need not be for appraisal purposes the highest 
and best use. 
See, for example State v. Jacobs, 16 Ut 2d 167, 397 P2d 
463 (1964), at page 169, where this court observed on September 
20, 1962, 
" . . . the State commenced this action by service 
of summons upon the defendants. At that time the 
property was zoned by Washington County for agricultural 
and grazing purposes." 
then, after tracing the chain of title and the defendants1 
ultimate acquisition of the property, the court continued: 
"Defendants1 claim that the lower court committed error 
in that it (1) instructed the jury that the price paid 
for the tract was immaterial; (2) excluded evidence 
relating to the proposed development of the property; 
and (3) excluded evidence regarding the probability of a 
zoning change." 
Although rejecting the defendants1 claims, the court 
nonetheless indicated the ruling law at page 170 as follows: 
"The owner of property under condemnation is 
entitled to a value based upon the highest and best use 
to which it could be put at the time of the taking, 
without limitation as to the use then actually made of 
it. However, the projected use, affecting value, must 
not only be possible, but reasonably probably. It must 
not be merely in the realm of speculation because the 
land is adaptable to a particular use in the remote and 
uncertain future." (Emphasis added.) 
The Jacobs case was later quoted by the Supreme Court in 
a case remarkably similar to this case. In State of Utah by and 
through its Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P2d 872 
(1969), the State took 7.23 acres of vacant land located in Cedar 
City which at the time had been zoned by Cedar City as light 
industrial in anticipation of the State's condemnation. The court 
described the facts as follows at page 318: 
"In 1956 [twelve years before the condemnation] the 
defendant's tract of land had been made part of a 
proposed residential subdivision called Northwood. The 
development had not further materialized. In December 
of 1961, it had been rezoned light industrial. The 
evidence indicates, and the trial court accepted the 
view, that this was done in anticipation of the 
construction of a new Interstate 1-15 freeway, and the 
prospect of its connecting with Highway U-56 leading 
west from Cedar City." 
The trial court had admitted evidence as to the highest 
and best use for the subject property as being residential 
subdivision, to which the State objected, and the Supreme Court 
ruled at page 319: 
"If the damages are to be appraised on the basis of 
the 'actual value at that date,' that is, the time of the 
service of summons, which is deemed to be the time the 
property is taken, consideration must be given to all 
factors bearing upon such value that a prudent and willing 
buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take 
into account, including any potentional development which 
could with reasonable certainty be expected with respect to 
the property. This court has but recently in the case of 
State by and through Road Commission v. Jacobs, by Justice 
Callister, affirmed that the owner is entitled to the 
valuation of his property at the time it is taken on the 
basis of, its highest and best use and that this is 'without 
limitation as to the use then actually made of it,'" 
(Emphasis added.) 
"(ii) Duchesne County had a moratorium for subdivision 
development at the time [of the taking]." 
Mr. Palmer was well aware of that moratorium, 
investigated it, discovered the likelihood of annexation to 
Altamont City (which would have taken the property out of any 
moratorium), and further opined that had a subdivider presented 
a plat to the county, the county would have entertained such a 
subdivision possibility in spite of the moratorium. Moreover, 
defendant's own witness, Jerry D. Allred, a member of the Duchsne 
County Subdivision Ordinance Revision Committee, (R. 738) 
testified that the moratorium expired in any event at least by 
November 18, 1983, (R. 73 9) or two and a half months at the most 
after the date in question. 
(iii) that annexation is only permissible with 
"completely adjacent parcels" and opines that annexation "probably 
would not have occurred" because the Smith parcel was "adjacent to 
Altamont on only one corner." 
The reference then to the record reveals testimony only 
about the corner touching, not to the earlier statements which are 
speculations of counsel not supported by any facts in evidence. 
On the contrary, defendant's own witness, Mr. Allred, who was a 
licensed surveyor, was asked by defense counsel what experience he 
had had with regard to annexing a property to city, and the 
witness indicated he had done work in Duchesne City, Tabiona and 
Roosevelt, (R. 740) and then was asked by defense counsel what 
problems would be posed by annexing the Smith parcel to Altamont. 
Plaintiffs objected since his experience did not include 
annexation for Altamonty City, and the objection was sustained. 
Then he was asked about annexing to cities generally, and the 
court permitted his testimony to the effect that touching a city 
at one point would not justify annexation. (R. 743) 
On cross-examination, however, he was asked to examine 
Exhibit 22, which was a county map that includes Altamont City, 
acknowledged that the Smith property's south border abuts the 
school property which, while it belongs to a separate political 
subdivision called a school district, was part and parcel of 
Altamont City, subject to the same services, utilities 
connections, etc., as the rest of city property, and that the 
utility parcel in the southwest corner of Section 25 was also 
within the city limits and west of the school property. Reference 
to the exhibit itself shows that Altamont City continues to extend 
west of the school parcel on the south side of the main highway. 
Allred was unwilling, however, to admit that a common boundary 
with the school district property would satisfy the city's need 
for annexation, as follows: 
"Q And in regards to that can you familiarize yourself, 
looking at Exhibit No. 1, to show us what point at Exhibit 22 
this point of touching you allude to is on Exhibit 22? 
"A Right here (indicating). 
"Q Would you make a circle around that with the pen please. 
"A (witness complies.) 
"Q Now the property immediately west from that point you 
have just identified in the upper right hand corner of the 
northernmost portion of Altamont City limits all of the 
property to the west belongs to the Duchesne County School 
District, does it not? 
"A Yes, all of that that is not being used by county roads. 
"Q But there is also some property utilized in the southwest 
corner of that by whom? 
"A By the Uinta Basin Telephone Company. 
"Q Telephone company? 
"A I believe. 
"Q It services telephones in Altamont and surrounding areas as 
far as you know? 
"A I have no idea what it does. 
"Q And the city continues west to that west corner of the 
school board property on the main highway, isn't that correct? 
"A Down the center of the highway, yes. 
"Q All right, and in fact generally speaking the school 
district property, even if it is a city school district 
property, because it is tax exempt property isn't considered 
part of a city, is it? 
"A No I do not believe that. 
"Q Is it taxed? 
"A I assume that it isn't. 
"Q It is not? And is it submitted or is it connected to the 
city utilities, generally speaking? 
"A I assume that it is. 
"Q And gets the city services? 
"A Probably does, (R. 745-48) 
He was also asked on cross-examination the following: 
"Q You are also aware, aren't you, there are cities that have 
parcels of land that are part of the city property that don't 
touch prior existing city limits and are islands or irregular 
intrusions and all kinds of variations in cities all over the 
state? Aren't you aware of that? 
"A I am aware that cities zone other parcels. 
"Q You are also aware that the city limit lines sometimes have 
islands, sometimes have intruding peninsulas or extruding 
peninsulas and all other kinds of configurations, isn't that 
so? 
"A I would need to know more about all other kinds. 
"Q Well yes, but a wide variety, will you go that far? 
"A I would say that, yes." (R. 744-45) 
Reference to Exhibit 22 shows that north of the Smith 
parcel, well outside the Altamont City line, is a small island 
that is Altamont City on which its water tanks are placed. 
The final exchange with Mr. Allred brought out these 
significant facts: 
"Q Moreover, even if someone were to apply to the zoning 
commission and be turned down, the ultimate determiner as to 
whether a subdivision is or is not approved in the county is 
the county commission; isn't that correct? 
"A Theirs is the final signature. 
"Q And in regard to a city, even if there were a city planning 
commission, the ultimate arbitror in that situation would be 
the mayor and city council; is that correct? 
"A That's correct." (R. 750) 
Contrast that with the language of Richard Palmer as 
follows: 
"Q So how did you come to conclude the highest and best use at 
that time was subdivision, if there was a moratorium in the 
county? 
"A In visiting with the mayor. 
"Q Of Altamont? 
"A Yes, Tidwell. At that time the town would have been very 
receptive to have added that 20 acre parcel to that city or 
town." (R. 350) 
"(iv) There was no demand for subdivision lots in 
August, 1983," says defendant, and Palmer was unaware of "how many 
subdivisions" there were at that time in Altamont, "the number of 
lots for sale" in a particular subdivision "or how much property 
was available" and further contends that he was unaware of the 
"drop in building activity," as reflected in the building permits 
for the whole county in the years 1982 and 1983. 
The testimony is as follows: 
"Q I'm talking about the issue of demand for residential lots 
in the area of the Smith parcel, and you have indicated in your 
opinion that there is a demand. We have established you 
haven't checked the building department records, and I'm 
telling you that assuming the building department reflected 
that in 1982 there was 123 permits for single family homes and 
100 permits for mobile homes, and in '83 that figure reduced 
more than half to 59 homes and down from 178 mobile homes to 
83, would that effect your opinion regarding trends and demands 
for lots in the Smith area? 
"Mr. Madsen: One final qualification. Are those figures 
pretending to be for the Smith area or the whole county? 
"Mr. Christiansen: Duchesne County. 
"Mr. Madsen: The whole county? 
"Mr. Christiansen: Yes. 
"Mr. Madsen: But we are talking about the whole county and its 
reflection on this particular one piece? 
"Mr. Christiansen: Yes. 
"The Witness: It would still indicate to me there is a demand 
for single family homesites." (R. 547-48) 
That admission of a demand for property in the Altamont 
area is futher buttressed by the testimony of Mr. Curtis, the only 
witness who, acting as a broker and appraiser, made his appraisal 
at the time, summer of 1983, in the following exchange: 
"Q Did you have the same view on a four-acre basis as to the 
highest and best use being agriculture, as the 20-acre piece? 
"A Probably not. On a four-acre piece a person would be able, 
even without a subdivision, a person would be able to go in and 
use that property if that four acres had been available. They 
could use that property for an individual home site or a ranch 
site or for a mobile home, as well as for pasture land. 
"Q For a horse or some other domestic animal? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Was there a demand for that kind of property at that time? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Considerable, minor, moderate? How would you characterize 
it? 
"A In the Altamont area the demand was quite high, mainly 
because of the availability of the properties was so low. In 
other areas people were willing to subdivide if they could, or 
if they had already established. But it was not easy to find 
property like this in Altamont." (R. 323-24) (Emphasis added.) 
(v) Defendant claims that "Palmer had not done any 
calculations" with regard to utilities, roads, telephone lines, 
etc. 
That testimony is already summarized in plaintiffs1 
Brief, and to repeat, Palmer did not figure in the cost of the 
utilities because he was not valuing it as a completed 
subdivision, but simply as land available for subdivision and 
testified how near at hand each of the various utilities was. In 
addition, Palmer testified that the City of Altamont supplied some 
of the utilities on the Thacker Subdivision installed a few years 
prior to the relevant date in question and that a reasoanble buyer 
could expect to get assistance from Altamont City in the 
construction of utilities. 
Again, that hardly constitutes a "complete disregard" of 
the competent issues. 
(vi) Finally, defendant's attorneys baldly assert, 
without any reference to the record, but simply expressing their 
own opinion, that Mr. Palmer could not have possibly considered 
the highest and best use being residential as being "reasonable 
and probable," and flatly assert a "subdivision on plaintiffs' 
property was neither reasonable nor probable." 
Plaintiffs have already treated that matter at length 
in their original Brief at pages 23 to 30. 
There are some remaining mischaracterizations of the 
facts by defendant such as its assertion at page 21 of its Brief 
that Palmer's "experience in Duchesne County was limited to 
possibly one appraisal per year." The testimony in that 
connection is as follows: 
"Q How many appraisals have you actually done in Duchesne 
County during the time you've been an appraiser? 
"A Just a guess would be 15 or 20. 
"Q And how many did you do for appraisals during the year 
1983? 
"A I don't know for sure if I done any, I testified I was 
doing one in either '82 or '83. 
"Q So at that time maybe one a year in Duchesne County? Is 
that a fair statement? 
"A During any one particular year such as '82 that could be 
correct. Previous years there would have been more than that 
done in any one particular year." (R. 528-29) (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant alleges that Palmer improperly included 
the Indian water right to which Linmar Energy had no title or 
interest. That matter was discussed at some length, and these 
are the final questions and answers: 
"Q (by Mr. Christiansen) I'm talking about simply an 
arm'slength transaction involving a willing buyer and a willing 
seller. Isn't it true that the property would be more valuable 
with the full Indian water right than without it? 
"A If the willing buyer wanted to utilize the 20 acres in a 
way that the water would be of no use to him, he wouldn't care 
about it. If the willing buyer wanted to use the property as 
agricultural property, the water right has a use. 
"Q As an appraiser you would value the property higher with 
the water right, would you not? 
"A Again it would depend on what use. I valued it as a 
subdivision. (Emphasis added.) (R. 584) 
Defendant cites O'Conner v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 
63 Fed 2d 523 (8th Circuit 1933), in support of its proposition 
that plaintiffs are not entitled to the value of the highest and 
best use of the land taken. The O'Conner case is simply not 
applicable in Utah in the light of Flying Diamond v. Rust. 
Likewise, Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 
75 S.W. 2d 844 (Missouri, 1939), cited by the defendant is 
inapplicable in the light of Flying Diamond v. Rust. 
POINT IV. DEFENDANT'S USE OF APPRAISER CARROLL WAS NOT 
BASED UPON HIS SUPERIOR QUALIFICATIONS TO THOSE OF APPRAISER 
CURTIS. 
In an effort to try to rehabilitate their conduct in 
using Carroll in place of Curtis at the last minute in order to 
provide an appraisal one-half that which they had used to make 
their offer and on which they were supposedly relying in terms of 
communications with counsel until the eve of trial, defendant 
asserts: 
"Defendant's decision not to use Mr. Curtis as a. 
witness was based on his lack of qualifications to 
testify as an expert witness on property valuations. 
Mr. Curtis did not have any appraisal designations and 
had never testified in court regarding property 
valuations." (Page 11 of defendant's Brief.) 
Defendant neglects to additionally mention that the 
witness they did use, one Howard R. Carroll, was and is by 
profession a banker with appraising as a sideline only, who also 
had no "appraisal designations." They therefore didn't provide a 
better witness or a more qualified witness, just a "lower" one. 
Specifically, Mr. Carroll was asked at the outset of his 
testimony, after talking about the few classes he had taken from 
the State Tax Commission and classes offered at BYU, he claimed 
the designation of a C.R.E.A." He was then asked by defense 
counsel: 
"Q What is a C.R.E.A? 
"A Certified Real Estate Appraiser. 
"Q When did you receive that? 
"A About a year and a half ago. 
"Q What do you have to do to obtain that certification? 
"A That's a professional organization of real estate 
appraisers. It is not an organization to which extensive 
educational background is required." (R. 376) 
On cross-examination he further acknowledged that the 
great majority of his appraisals were in connection with the 
making of loans and that, while he had occasionally represented 
some landowners in some lawsuits as an expert witness, the great 
bulk of his work was on behalf of lending institutions. (R. 413) 
So defendant had a choice of two appraisers, one of whom 
they relied on to make a would-be offer on the property and the 
other, with no greater qualifications, but who had the actual 
experience of sitting in the witness chair and, using the very 
same market data gathered by the first, came in at one-half the 
first's appraisal. 
Plaintiffs again contend that defendant has not 
justified its choice of witnesses, but simply added more fuel to 
the bad-faith claim originally asserted by them. 
Moreover, it seems significant that defendant has not 
one word in its Brief trying to rehabilitate Mr. Carroll's 
testimony and the objectionable character thereof that is pointed 
out at length in plaintiffs1 original Brief. 
In its Brief, at page 11, defendant asserts, without 
reference to the record, that Mr. Curtisfs testimony "as an expert 
witness regarding property values" was rejected by the court. 
That is not accurate. Curtis was never tendered by plaintiffs or 
by defendant as an expert witness. Plaintiffs attempted to have 
Curtis testify about his involvement in the case relating to 
negotiations between plaintiffs and defendant, but that proffered 
testimony was rejected by the court on the ground that it dealt 
with settlement negotiations. That ruling was error, and the 
testimony should have been admitted for the limited purpose of 
showing bad faith on the part of defendant, but Curtis was not 
rejected by the court as an expert witness. There has to be a 
first time for every expert witness to testify in court, and such 
a witness is not barred from testifying just because he had not 
testified before. 
POINT V. THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO 
ROYALTIES DOES NOT PRECLUDE THEIR RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR THE 
TAKING OF THEIR PROPERTY. 
Next defendant tries to argue that plaintiffs should be 
content with only the benefits of the lease and not be entitled to 
damages for the ground taken for the well site and road. 
Defendant asserts at page 16: 
"Plaintiff should not be allowed to receive the 
benefits of the lease, i.e., the royaltiy, and then 
claim that although the ground is subject to a valid 
lease in favor of defendant, plaintiff is not bound by 
the terms of the lease as to damages. To allow 
plaintiff to recover damages under a theory of eminent 
domain would be improper and without precedent." 
This argument overlooks the fact that all the people 
holding leases in Section 25 are collecting royalties, but only 
the plaintiffs1 land got stuck with the burden of a well and a 
well site, and whether one calls it eminent domain theory or 
Flying Diamond v. Rust theory, these plaintiffs are entitled to 
damages, separate and apart from any entitlement to royalties. It 
is equally obvious that such recovery is not a case of "have their 
cake and eat it too," nor is it overreaching by the plaintiffs as 
asserted by defendant at pages 16 and 17 of its Brief. It is true 
that the lease spells out the amount of royalty, but without the 
lease, plaintiffs still own the oil, and defendant has nothing. 
POINT VI. DEFENDANT ERRS IN ITS BRIEF IN SUGGESTING 
THAT THE MINERAL LESSEE CAN PLACE ITS OIL DRILLING FACILITIES 
ANYWHERE IT DESIRES. 
At page 14 of its Brief defendant cites 38 Am Jur 2d, 
Gas and Oil, Section 115, and alleges with respect thereto that 
Flying Diamond is consistent therewith. We respectfully submit 
that Flying Diamond is not consistent therewith. The Am Jur 
citation seems to indicate that a lessee can place oil drilling 
facilities anywhere he wants without regard to the surface owner 
even though such a placement would be equally convenient for the 
lessee. We believe that Flying Diamond stands for just the 
opposite, that the lessee not only must accommodate the owner 
where it is not hurtful to the lessee to do so, but even in cases 
where it is hurtful if the balancing of interests so dictates, 
POINT VII. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST AT THE RATE OF TEN PERCENT PER ANNUM. 
Defendant claims at page 29 of its Brief that 
prejudgment interest is not proper because " . . . the theories of 
recovery and the appraisals [are] so divergent, it is impossible 
to calculate with mathematical certainty any damage sustained by 
plaintiffs." (See page 29 of respondent's Brief.) 
The number of theories of recovery is irrelevant. The 
only question is, does the correct theory of recovery allow 
prejudgment interest? Likewise, the divergency of appraisals is 
irrelevant. Once the fact finder determines value, prejudgment 
interest applies to that amount. The existence of conflicting 
testimony has no bearing on the right to prejudgment interest. 
The trial court appeared to base its decision in part at 
least upon breach of the lease provision regarding growing crops. 
It is elementary that a cause of action for breach of contract 
would entitled plaintiffs to prejudgment interest. Furthermore, 
the standard adopted by the court of "fair market value" is a 
sufficient standard in and of itself to require the awarding of 
prejudgment interest, whether under a contract theory or other 
theory. In determining fair market value, the time of the injury 
is "certain," namely the time of the taking, and the damages are 
measured by an "available standard." The fact finder is not 
allowed to determine fair market value in its unrestricted 
judgment as a fact finder can do in the case of "pain and 
suffering," for example. Fair market value is based upon the 
evidence and upon the legal definition of fair market value, which 
in essence is the price at which a person having something which 
he desired to sell, but was not under compulsion to sell, could 
and would sell the property to a person who desired to buy, but 
was under no compulsion to buy. 
Damage to property, whether personal or real, involves a 
determination of the fair market value of the property before the 
injury and after the injury, and the cases cited in plaintiffs1 
original Brief clearly allow interest for damage to property. See 
Fell v. Union Pacific, 32 Ut 101, 88 P 1003 (1907), and Uinta 
Pipeline v. White Superior Company, 546 P2d 885 (Utah 1976). 
For the reasons stated in plaintiffs1 original Brief at 
pages 41 to 44, Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, does not 
preclude the ten percent interest rate. Defendant does not 
address those reasons, nor refute the same, and there appears to 
be no need for rebuttal, and the interest rate should be 
determined to be ten percent per annum. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs respectfully 
request that this Court reverse the lower court's determination 
that the defendant met the requirements of Flying Diamond in 
selecting the location of the well-site and road, that the Court 
determine that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the 
4.76 acres taken, together with severance damages, and that the 
Court determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation 
for all of the foregoing damages at the highest and best use of 
the property, to-wit, residential purposes, that the Court 
determine that the property taken by the defendant has no residual 
value to plaintiffs of $375 per acre, or of any other sum, and 
that the Court determine that plaintiffs are entitled to 
prejudment interest at the rate of 10% per annun, and that the 
Court remand this case to the lower court for a determination of 
the fair market value for the highest and best use of the 
property, to-wit, residential purposes, both as to the 4.76 acres 
taken and as it relates to severance damages to the remainder of 
plaintiffs' tract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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